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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                         
No. 03-2515
                          
PORFIRIO YUPANWQUI,
                                                    Petitioner
v.
JOHN ASHCROFT, Attorney General
of the United States, and
BUREAU OF CITIZENSHIP AND
IMMIGRATION SERVICES (BCIS)
DISTRICT DIRECTOR,
                                                      Respondents
                                                 
On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals
(Board No. A78-573-882)
                                              
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
on 11/15/04
Before: ROTH , SMITH, and WEIS, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: December 17, 2004)
                                  
OPINION
                                   
ROTH, Circuit Judge:  
     1We will not discuss the facts because we write only for the parties and they are
familiar with them.  
2
Petitioner Porfirio Yupanqui is a native of Peru.  On November 11, 1989, he
entered the United States without inspection in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i)
and was subject to removal from the United States.  Yupanqui conceded his removability
before an Immigration Judge (IJ) but applied for a cancellation of removal in accordance
with 8 U.S.C. § 1229(b).  On December 7, 2001, the IJ denied Yupanqui’s application for
cancellation of removal.  The IJ held that Yupanqui did not demonstrate that his
American citizen daughter would suffer “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” –
as defined in 8 U.S.C. § 1229(b)(1)(D) – if he were to be removed from the United States. 
This decision was affirmed without an opinion (AWO) by the Board of Immigration
Appeals (BIA).  
Yupanqui seeks a petition for review by this court.  He raises two issues that he
feels were errors committed during the previous proceedings.  He argues (1) that the IJ’s
decision concerning the lack of a showing of “exceptional and extremely unusual
hardship” was erroneous, and (2) that his due process rights were violated by the BIA’s
decision to affirm without issuing an opinion.  Because we lack the jurisdiction to review
discretionary decisions made by the IJ and because the BIA’s AWO does not violate due
process, we will deny Yupanqui’s petition.1  
We have recently held in an analogous case that pursuant to 8 U.S.C. §
31252(a)(2)(B)(i), we do not have jurisdiction to hear discretionary decisions made under 8
U.S.C. § 1229(b).  Mendez-Moranchel v. Ashcroft, 338 F.3d 176, 178 (3d Cir. 2003).  We
also held that the question of whether an alien can establish “exceptional and extremely
unusual hardship” under Section 1229(b)(1)(D) is a discretionary question.  Id. at 178-79. 
We stated that, “[t]he determination of whether the alien has established the requisite
hardship is a quintessential discretionary judgment.”  Id. at 179.  This decision was
consistent with other circuits that addressed the same question.  Id.  Thus, we lack
jurisdiction to address Yupanqui’s argument that the IJ and BIA wrongly decided that he
did not meet the necessary hardship standard.  
As to the due process argument, after Yupanqui filed his brief in this appeal, we
held in Dia v. Ashcroft, 353 F.3d 228 (3d Cir. 2003), that “the BIA could have articulated
its reasons for affirming the IJ’s order, but just because it had the power to do so, does not
mean the Constitution required it to exercise that power.”  Id. at 240.  We concluded that
a “meaningful review” is established as long as either the BIA or the IJ “put forth a
sufficiently reasoned opinion.”  Id. at 243. The IJ’s opinion here meets that standard.
Hence, with Dia as controlling precedent in this circuit, Yupanqui’s due process argument
fails.  
For the aforementioned reasons, we will deny Yupanqui’s petition for review.  
